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Here courtesy me are two new YouTube playlists:

Chuck Eddy's 11 Best Singles Of 2020

Chuck Eddy's Best Singles 2020 Numbers 12 To 33 alphabetical by artist

And Chuck's writeup of same.



And here's a provisional list of my Top 8 Nonsingles for 2020:



And here's a revised provisional list of my Top 8 Nonsingles for 2020 as of 1/1/21 that wedges in some baile funk:





As you can see, I still distinguish between singles and nonsingles, the latter being album tracks and other tracks that I decide are not singles, and someday I'm going to create a philosophical admin post where I explain what a single is. Okay, here it is: a single is something that acts like a single in some way, say the artist or record company says "here's the new single" or creates an actual video for it as opposed to a mere live video, lyric video, or audio video except those can also be considered "singles" by me if they get enough streams or if the artist etc. has already said "this is my new single" or if it's a talent show performance that a lot of people got excited about; also if an act just creates a knockoff that he/she/they posts somewhere themselves, that IS nonetheless a single because it's singular enough no matter if it only gets a few streams, but if the artist is taking the same basic track and redoing it every week for twenty-one weeks with a different singer or different mix and title (I'm thinking of you, DJ Will DF) those are not singles though one could become a single by getting a lot of streams; but a track is a single if it's a radio hit or streaming hit no matter what the artist or label intended, also is a hit if some big enough communities act like it's a hit or make it a big subject of attention, so Sault's "Wildfires" is a single, as back in the day were Jay-Z's "Takeover" and the Rolling Stones' "Sympathy For The Devil"** and Led Zeppelin's full-length "Stairway To Heaven" even though there'd been no physical single or official designation as a "single." For what it's worth, I've got Semi Tee's "Scooter" on my Nonsingles list (so far), though Chuck's got it on his singles list.* And my favorite of Hyuna's live TV versions of "Just Follow" featuring Zico (as opposed to the EP track which featured Dok2 who wrote it) made my singles list for 2011 (iirc) but is on my Top 5 Nonsingles Of The 2010s 'cause that's where there was room for it (I've not gotten around to posting here about that list but here's the playlist). Btw Qri, the member of T-ara I never paid attention to, managed to get two solo shots on that list!

*[UPDATE: Chuck tells me that "Scooter" is on neither of Semi Tee's albums and was uploaded as a stand-alone single on Rhapsody/Napster in May of 2020. That does seem definitive, though there’s no vid and not a lot of streams; approx 50,000 on Spotify and fewer on YouTube. But several people have posted videos of themselves dancing to it, PLUS there’s a Chipmunks version, which are both single-y type behavior on the song’s behalf; so I guess I'll move it over to my singles list. I mean, a Chipmunks version would seem to decide the question once and for all in favor of its being a single! (Interestingly, it was uploaded all the way back last January.)]

**[CORRECTION: Damn, I should've checked this. There actually was a physical single for "Sympathy For The Devil," though I can't tell from Wikip if it was ever released in America: the song got no AM airplay or chart action; it was played to death on FM back when FM still had few listeners. I wouldn't be surprised if all the sales went to the album. But anyway, there was no physical single for "Gimme Shelter" and I'd sure count that as a single.]



Oh, and I haven't decided what to do about TikTok which I haven't paid much attention to though if something's a hit there it's surely a single but then you have to figure out which version to link as the "single," but anyway I've got on my 2020 singles list someone's YouTube compilation of a bunch of TikTok kids lipsyncing the same fragment from Life Without Buildings, because linking them all together creates an amazing repetitive track in itself, sorta like Baauer's great "Harlem Shake." (Also, check out the latest version of my Ongoing Singles list for 2020; new additions towards the bottom which I'll eventually distribute upward.)



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To continue my X-post extravaganza, I put this on both the BLEUGH thread and the Adjunct thread. Mark had brought up Leroi Jones/Amiri Baraka, and I'd said — based on my unreliable memory — that, to Jones, "Black American culture contains — among other things — a critique of America, and he doesn’t want to see that critique blunted" (e.g., Black American musical practice contains a critique of America):

(1) Any opinion on Sidney Finkelstein? I read Jazz: A People's Music but can't recall specifically what I took from it; and I once owned but out of a combination of busyness and fear never read How Music Expresses Ideas (the fear because, when I opened it at random, I read something along the lines of "While the Soviet criticism of Shostakovich may have been heavy-handed, there was a fundamental truth...,"* and decided I just wasn't up for it emotionally; I'm sometimes very weak). Do remember considering the jazz book interesting and smart; also that Jones/Baraka cited him favorably — notice that for the title of my John Wójtowicz–Leroi Jones chapter I paraphrase the title "How Music..."

(2) A question we should go into — that we're implicitly raising — is whether Jones (as I've perceived or misperceived him) is right, that music (in comparison to, say, books and essays) is up to the task of creating a cultural critique, at least creating a critique that's more than merely incipient.

(3) Actually it's Otis Ferguson and Manny Farber and Andrew Sarris and ilk who really propelled me to the question. The way I thought of it in college was that the two great proto-auteurists, Ferguson and André Bazin, both treated filmmakers' aesthetic decisions (not just dialogue, but what to show, how to show it, whether to cut or pan, what angle to use) as ways of thinking. To put it crudely, Bazin reads movies for, among other things, the filmmakers' attitudes towards the world, whereas Ferguson reads movies for, among other things, what filmmakers are doing in the world. But obv. it's not either/or for those two critics or in general. Anyway, extend to anyone's behavior, e.g., musician choosing to play this note rather than that, singer phrasing this way or that, fan deciding to dance and deciding which dance, person wearing or not wearing band T-shirt, and on and on and on. Question is, does this hairstyle and acting out really take us far in the way of usable and repeatable critique, of effective understanding, rather than just placing us in Spot A or Spot B etc. in various social situations? (Ludwig Wittgenstein belongs here: we can include in our idea of language that it's more than just the utterances/words, it's also the social practices in which they're embedded, including events, actions.) Btw, what I drew from auteurism wasn't "the director is the author of the film" but rather that filmmaking is a series of choices, and these choices, no matter how original or how rote, constitute thought, no matter whom or what you assign the thought to — the actor, the screenwriter, the director, the studio, social habits, the social structure, the zeitgeist — and no matter how good or bad the thought is. Question is, how far does such thought go? E.g., how a cashier goes about scanning bar codes represents thought, but that doesn't necessarily mean one's scanning of bar codes is a form of social commentary, or can be extrapolated into social commentary.

*Can't locate the exact quote through Google books, which doesn't show any general excerpts and is sparing as to what from my searches of this book it's willing to show. The phrase "heavy-handed" gets me no hits. I did find this noxious sentence: "In the Soviet Union, criticism is a sign of the high regard the people have for music and its creators."
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Take a very simple Wittgensteinian language-game, e.g., a bricklayer says "BRICK" and the bricklayer's assistant brings her the brick.* All of this is part of the language-game: not just the utterance "BRICK," but also the assistant bringing the brick — so the actions as well as the sound. You don't have one part being language and another part not. It's all language, and if you leave out the actions it's not complete.**

Of course, at times the assistant could understand that he's to bring a brick, yet he chooses not to, in defiance or as a joke; or he may be prevented from doing so, say by an injury; and that doesn't mean the language-game is incomplete in these instances. As long as the practice is there, the established practice of "BRICK" and an assistant bringing the brick, the language-game is in effect. And defiance and humor are expressible in this language, too, even though the language only contains one word, the command "BRICK." (Suppose, somehow, there's miscommunication in the game. Or some misunderstanding, the assistant incorrectly thinking that it's only when the bricklayer has her arm raised as she's uttering "BRICK" that he's to bring the brick. Or maybe sometimes the bricklayer doesn't mean it, and the assistant has to figure out when. A game doesn't have to be conducted with absolutely certainty to be a game; a language doesn't have to have absolute certainty and consistency to be a language.)

We can define "language-games" as being, more or less, "human social practices." The terms "language-game" and "social practice" are near synonyms, language being so ubiquitous. But let's see what happens if we go further. Let's get rid of "more or less." Let's say that all human social practices are language-games, whether or not any word is actually spoken in the practice, and whether or not all the parties even know a language. Yes, at least one of them — the parent of a baby, for instance — will have to know a language; but the other(s) won't have to. So parental action and baby wails and goos and parental response are all in the category "language-game." A baby being initiated into parent-child social behavior is a baby being initiated into language.***

By this definition, all musical events, including the "nonverbal," are nonetheless in some language-game or other. This doesn't mean "can be made part of a language-game by translating musical sounds into words or by describing the music in words." It means that the language-game includes musical sounds as they are, and we can take the sounds and see their role in particular games — particular social practices — just as we can take the utterances and actions in the "BRICK" language and see their roles in that particular practice. In any event, we refuse to give the social practices we call "music" the special status of being "nonverbal." They aren't.

Motive here is to tease out what might be usable in Mark's glimmer of an idea )

Footnotes (as opposed to musical notes?) )
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Posting again on a subject I don't understand and never will: what physicists mean by "information." My brain balks at mathematical symbols, but I'm good at concepts; so my guess is that if some articulate physicist were to wander by, he or she could explain "conservation of information" in a way that doesn't totally leave me at sea. Wikipedia hasn't succeeded*, but this passage from the entry on "Black hole information paradox" is useful:

There are two main principles in play:

--Quantum determinism means that given a present wave function, its future changes are uniquely determined by the evolution operator.
--Reversibility refers to the fact that the evolution operator has an inverse, meaning that the past wave functions are similarly unique.

The combination of the two means that information must always be preserved.
What I gather from this is that: (i) any present "state" must have a unique past; you can't have two pasts leading to the same present; and (ii) the present can't lead to multiple futures. Am I interpreting this right? So a quantum waveform (?) version of a Laplace Demon** could reconstitute the past or forecast the future (or maybe, this being quanta, could reconstitute past probability wave something-or-other and forecast future probability wave something-or-other) based on what's known now. Hence information is preserved. So, however you twist it, you'll always have the same information.

Black holes seem to pose a problem for the principle )

The question I posed last time is, "When physicists say that information is preserved even after everything's been absorbed into black holes that have subsequently evaporated, do they mean that, e.g., 'The test tomorrow is at 1:00 PM' is preserved?" Certainly in my everyday use of the term "information," "the test tomorrow is at 1:00 PM" is information. So I can simplify my question down to this:

Is "The test tomorrow is at 1:00 PM" preserved (by the principle of conservation of information)? If not, what is preserved?

Changed my mind since last time )

I continue to have little idea what I'm talking about. But right now I'd reformulate the question as:

If all physical information is preserved, how can "The test tomorrow is at 1:00 PM" not be preserved?

And a corollary to that one would be:

If all physical information is preserved, and this — somehow — does not include "The test tomorrow is at 1:00 PM" being preserved, then how is it possible that "The test tomorrow is at 1:00 PM" exists even now?

So, to convince myself that all information can be preserved while "The test tomorrow is at 1:00 PM" is not preserved, I'd have to have an explanation for why "The test tomorrow is at 1:00 PM" isn't preserved. And to do that, I'd have to have an explanation for how it can exist now without being physical information. We as physical beings sure seem to have the information that the test tomorrow is at 1:00 PM. So far I can't counter this, can't come up with an explanation of how physical beings can have nonphysical information, or what "nonphysical information" would even mean. I don't think physicists, to the extent that they've thought about it, disbelieve that "mental" and "cultural" information can be conveyed by physical information, or that the latter two sorts of information are different in kind from the former. Actually, I don't know what they think. But how would they even potentially explain the existence of "cultural information" at all if such information is not conveyable physically?

That's what I would need to explain, if I wanted to preserve the principle of "conservation of information" while denying the conservation of "The test tomorrow is at 1:00 PM." Not that I necessarily want to deny that "The test tomorrow is at 1:00 PM" can be preserved. What I'm saying is that I don't know how not to preserve it without destroying the principle of conservation of (physical) information — which for all I know is a wrong principle, but to half understand what physicists mean by it, I'm acting as if it's right. Quantum physics guys seem to believe it needs to be right. So, for the moment at least, I'm counting "The test tomorrow is at 1:00 PM" as physical information, hence preservable by "conservation of information."

So, to reiterate, I think the crucial question here, this time in bold, is: How can "The test tomorrow is at 1:00 PM" exist now without being physical information?

I'm deciding for the time being that it can't, and that therefore it is physical information.

No dif in physical status between things and conventions )

Social info has same physical status as any other info )

Footnotes )
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I asked this of B. Michael over on Tumblr, so I thought I ought to ask it of you all as well:

What do philosophers talk about these days, post-Wittgenstein and post-Kuhn? I've not kept up. (Not that I ever kept up.) Kuhn's notion of "paradigms" gets rid of the need for super-deep universal foundations for the scientific enterprise, and Wittgenstein's "family resemblances" does the same for pretty much everything. So what's left for philosophy? Not that I think philosophy departments should disband, but if I were in one I'd transform it into the Department Of Roving Troubleshooters Who Have More Fun Than Sociologists Seem To Have, or something.

EDIT: Er, perhaps I should elaborate slightly, though that could end up in a tangle, since my elaborations will need elaborations. But, e.g., if you're saying as I do that people's musical tastes tend to cluster by their social class, you then (if you're me) have to explore what you mean by social class (and keep exploring). Now, one could ask a philosopher instead, "Dear philosopher, What do I mean, or what should I mean, by 'social class'?" But it seems to me that what the philosopher says is of no more import than what anyone else says, that if s/he has something to say it isn't because s/he's a philosopher but because s/he's just another person trying to figure out in certain instances what we mean or should mean by "social class" in those and related instances. And as with "social class," so with "meaning" and "language" and so forth.
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I really like this post by Jonathan Bradley about distinguishing genres by sound versus distinguishing them by culture. This was my response (I was fundamentally saying that the two interweave - sound is culture - and that the direction of his argument wasn't against using sound as a criterion but against reducing one's criteria to sound):

The beats, the business model, the moon, and the stars )

I also linked Wittgenstein excerpts about family resemblance and the ilX discussion of Superwords as both being crucially useful tools in understanding this issue. (The ilX thread didn't start off about Superwords, and when it got there the topic was just one among many, so you have to search "superword" and then keep searching.)
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Now—judged by the usual criteria—the pupil has mastered the series of natural numbers. Next we teach him to write down other series of cardinal numbers and get him to the point of writing down series of the form

0, n, 2n, 3n, etc.

at an order of the form "+n"; so at the order "+1" he writes down the series of natural numbers. —Let us suppose we have done exercises and given him tests up to 1000.

Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond 1000—and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.

We say to him: "Look what you've done!"—He doesn't understand. We say: "You were meant to add
two: look how you began the series!"—He answers: "Yes, isn't it right? I thought that was how I was meant to do it."——Or suppose he pointed to the series and said: "But I went on in the same way."—It would now be no use to say: "But can't you see....?"—and repeat the old examples and explanations.—In such a case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this person to understand our order with our explanations as we should understand the order: "Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on."

Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip.

--Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, passage 185.
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Mark informs me that a well-regarded philosopher once said something somewhere linking "paradigm" to "metaphor." I haven't read this thing that the well-regarded philosopher said, but I felt like posting a caution anyway.

Not all resemblance is metaphoric )
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In my pragmatism writeup last month I deliberately buried the following paragraph for reasons that the paragraph itself makes plain.

I haven't yet mentioned philosophy, since I think that philosophy is a dead end, and pragmatism is better off liberated from philosophy. Of course the word "pragmatism" is associated with certain philosophers (Peirce, James, Dewey, Rorty, maybe Wittgenstein, some aspects of Quine). In any event, my pragmatism when applied to philosophy isn't a way of doing philosophy but just a critique of philosophy, one that attacks philosophy's sense of its own relevance. One form of attack is the sentence, paraphrased from my book, "As a philosopher I can say 'Nothing exists in isolation' and a minute later say 'I grew up in an isolated village' without contradicting myself, since the standards for isolation are different in the two sentences." And as with isolation, so it is with "autonomy," "independence," "essence," "necessity," "reality," and so forth. Which is to say that philosophy concerns itself with extremes that are rarely in effect but fools itself into thinking that in discussing these extremes it's dealing with the village - i.e., the world - as well. Note that this critique doesn't merely knock down philosophy: it also knocks down deconstructive and pragmatic attacks upon philosophy.

And I refer back to my Rorty post from last year (which I quite like and recommend you read in its entirety), a particularly relevant portion of it being:

What's going on when villagers make philosophy-like noises with their mouths? )
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Major General [livejournal.com profile] dubdobdee gave me the following five subjects/things he associates with me, instructing me to elaborate:

pragmatism! r. meltzer! red dark sweet! call-and-response! the rolling stones!

Never have been asked about pragmatism before, so I will give it its own long post, and do the other four some other day.

pragmatism )
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I'm posting several passages from Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations today not only because they are immediately relevant to Kuhn's idea of "paradigm" (in the sense of "exemplar") but because Kuhn himself cites them in The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions when he talks about scientists using paradigms rather than rules. And I'll say it's a pleasure to read these Wittgenstein passages again, compared to the vagueness and babble that makes up most philosophy. Not only is Wittgenstein a great writer, he's probably the author of the clearest, easiest, sanest prose ever written by a philosopher. (Not that all of his writings are easy, since you often have to have a sense of what ideas he's reacting against to understand why he makes the points he does; but these passages are clear on that count as well.)

I've added some commentary of my own, some of which - the stuff about "essentialism" not being a force in the world much beyond philosophy, so deconstruction and philosophical anti-essentialism miss the mark, are aimed at men of straw - wanders away from today's topic, but eventually we'll make our way to those other topics as well, and I simply felt like adding my thoughts on them here. And I've included what Kuhn wrote about the Wittgenstein passages, and I added a bit more of my own commentary.

To repeat: don't think, but look! )

Philosophy keeps trying to change the conversation back to what it knows how to talk about rather than what really is at issue )

Scientists work from models, and because they do so, they need no full set of rules )
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My Interests Collage! )

But they didn't have the right Paul Zimmerman, so here he is, Dr. Z:

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Frank Kogan

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