Neither rational nor irrational
Oct. 15th, 2013 07:22 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
koganbotSay I want to understand human financial behavior. The behavior is actually complex, but if I make the following simplifying assumptions I can at least have a place to start, and can make some calculations, predictions, etc.
(1) In the financial decisions (e.g., job choice, hiring, shopping, selling, investing) all people are trying to maximize their monetary profit or "financial" value and to cut their losses.
(2) Given the available information, people go about this pretty well (e.g., this apple at this store costs $2.00 a pound, the identical apple at that store costs $3.00 a pound, both stores are equally easy to get to and I'm going to both stores anyway for other reasons, so I buy the apple at the first store not the second).
(3) When things don't turn out so well, people modify their understanding of the information and (subject to the caveat in the footnote) they seek new, better information.*
We can say that, given assumption number 1, in doing numbers 2 and 3 people are being rational and that when people don't do 2 and 3 they're being irrational. But this all rests on the simplifying assumption number 1, that in all their financial decisions they're trying to maximize income or financial value etc. But to want to maximize money and financial value in the first place is neither rational nor irrational. And we know, or ought to know, that number 1 in itself is not altogether true, that maximizing profit is not the only motive in play: we posited it as a simplifying assumption so we could get a grip on economic behavior. Motives — such as loss aversion and brand loyalty — that run counter to profit maximizing are no more irrational (or rational) than maximizing profit is, and are no more or less emotional either.**
This is on my mind for two related reasons.
First, a couple of Paul Krugman posts about the parts of macroeconomics that have no "microfoundations" but nonetheless seem to describe macro results better than the alternatives: actually, I'm as ignorant of microeconomics as macro, but I do think that micro has simplifying assumptions that include something like my numbers 1 through 3 above, and that's exactly (or maybe not exactly) why the macro that's micro-based can't explain sticky wages and so on. (I don't pretend to understand the posts to any depth, by the way. But note the word "hyperrational" in the first post and "rational expectations" in the second, which I'm guessing mean that it's taken for granted by some people that assumption number 1 is in itself rational.)
Second, I recently got Daniel Kahneman's highly worthwhile Thinking, Fast And Slow from the library for the second time (I didn't finish it 11 months ago when it first became due), and I think if asked he would, or at least ought to, subscribe to my paragraph above beginning "We can say that..." But actually his language slips a lot, and "rational" and "emotions" sometimes float by in his text without explaining themselves. (I do believe he talks explicitly about at least one of them in the part I haven't read yet; but that doesn't mean he knows what he's doing when the words creep in earlier.)
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*The caveat is that, e.g., if I spent less time worrying about the price of apples and less time in grocery stores in general, where I compulsively compare prices, and more time writing and marketing my writing, I'd be better off financially. (Of course, the problem isn't so much that I spend the time on apple prices but that I flee marketing and, in general, flee engagement with other human beings, writing ultimately being an engagement. And I can develop compulsions that facilitate the fleeing.) In general, if you're a potentially commercially viable artist, you'll probably be better off financially by concentrating on doing your art than in taking too much time on your finances. Of course, thinking about finances and economics can be fun and interesting in themselves, and I think that, as a citizen and voter, you're morally obligated to have some broad sense of, e.g., what the good reasons are that macroeconomists give for deficit spending and government economic stimulus in the current economic situation.
**I meant to explain and give examples of "loss aversion" but don't have time. Maybe later in a comment. But one good example, which is not directly financial but you can figure out how it could relate, is that I've got piles and piles of old promo CDs, and I'm reluctant to sell or throw away a single one of them without relistening to it first. Whereas, nowadays, when I get emails regarding new music from many of the very same publicity firms who sent CDs in the old days, I only very, very occasionally click the links to hear the new music. That's loss aversion: the mere fact I possess the CDs makes my mind think that the music might have special value that I don't want to overlook. Now, loosely I could say I'm being irrational, but that's what I'm challenging: that the psychology underlying loss aversion is either more or less rational than is the psychological impulse to maximize profit.
(1) In the financial decisions (e.g., job choice, hiring, shopping, selling, investing) all people are trying to maximize their monetary profit or "financial" value and to cut their losses.
(2) Given the available information, people go about this pretty well (e.g., this apple at this store costs $2.00 a pound, the identical apple at that store costs $3.00 a pound, both stores are equally easy to get to and I'm going to both stores anyway for other reasons, so I buy the apple at the first store not the second).
(3) When things don't turn out so well, people modify their understanding of the information and (subject to the caveat in the footnote) they seek new, better information.*
We can say that, given assumption number 1, in doing numbers 2 and 3 people are being rational and that when people don't do 2 and 3 they're being irrational. But this all rests on the simplifying assumption number 1, that in all their financial decisions they're trying to maximize income or financial value etc. But to want to maximize money and financial value in the first place is neither rational nor irrational. And we know, or ought to know, that number 1 in itself is not altogether true, that maximizing profit is not the only motive in play: we posited it as a simplifying assumption so we could get a grip on economic behavior. Motives — such as loss aversion and brand loyalty — that run counter to profit maximizing are no more irrational (or rational) than maximizing profit is, and are no more or less emotional either.**
This is on my mind for two related reasons.
First, a couple of Paul Krugman posts about the parts of macroeconomics that have no "microfoundations" but nonetheless seem to describe macro results better than the alternatives: actually, I'm as ignorant of microeconomics as macro, but I do think that micro has simplifying assumptions that include something like my numbers 1 through 3 above, and that's exactly (or maybe not exactly) why the macro that's micro-based can't explain sticky wages and so on. (I don't pretend to understand the posts to any depth, by the way. But note the word "hyperrational" in the first post and "rational expectations" in the second, which I'm guessing mean that it's taken for granted by some people that assumption number 1 is in itself rational.)
Second, I recently got Daniel Kahneman's highly worthwhile Thinking, Fast And Slow from the library for the second time (I didn't finish it 11 months ago when it first became due), and I think if asked he would, or at least ought to, subscribe to my paragraph above beginning "We can say that..." But actually his language slips a lot, and "rational" and "emotions" sometimes float by in his text without explaining themselves. (I do believe he talks explicitly about at least one of them in the part I haven't read yet; but that doesn't mean he knows what he's doing when the words creep in earlier.)
*The caveat is that, e.g., if I spent less time worrying about the price of apples and less time in grocery stores in general, where I compulsively compare prices, and more time writing and marketing my writing, I'd be better off financially. (Of course, the problem isn't so much that I spend the time on apple prices but that I flee marketing and, in general, flee engagement with other human beings, writing ultimately being an engagement. And I can develop compulsions that facilitate the fleeing.) In general, if you're a potentially commercially viable artist, you'll probably be better off financially by concentrating on doing your art than in taking too much time on your finances. Of course, thinking about finances and economics can be fun and interesting in themselves, and I think that, as a citizen and voter, you're morally obligated to have some broad sense of, e.g., what the good reasons are that macroeconomists give for deficit spending and government economic stimulus in the current economic situation.
**I meant to explain and give examples of "loss aversion" but don't have time. Maybe later in a comment. But one good example, which is not directly financial but you can figure out how it could relate, is that I've got piles and piles of old promo CDs, and I'm reluctant to sell or throw away a single one of them without relistening to it first. Whereas, nowadays, when I get emails regarding new music from many of the very same publicity firms who sent CDs in the old days, I only very, very occasionally click the links to hear the new music. That's loss aversion: the mere fact I possess the CDs makes my mind think that the music might have special value that I don't want to overlook. Now, loosely I could say I'm being irrational, but that's what I'm challenging: that the psychology underlying loss aversion is either more or less rational than is the psychological impulse to maximize profit.
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no subject
Date: 2013-10-22 12:53 am (UTC)But his basic point is that profit-maximalizing is a value with a very specific (and very recent) history in the history of financial relations between people (which themselves go back as far as any recorded history -- some of the earliest texts, he argues, were basically ledgers). And furthermore a lot of research in other disciplines outside of economics (including Kahneman who to my knowledge he doesn't cite by name) have questioned how "fundamental" this value is.
There are lots of other values in history -- Graeber talks about gift economies, moral obligation to "repay" the debt of simply existing, and (my favorite) *spite* as a perfectly accepted foundation for economic formation in lots of societies, particularly stateless ones. Worth a skim, but like I said I couldn't even get to 200 pages before being diverted elsewhere.
no subject
Date: 2014-12-29 06:26 am (UTC)http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2013/01/the-very-last-david-graeber-post.html
I don't think the animus is particularly ideological, though at this point it seems kind of personal, not to mention professional (that is, someone — DeLong — who thinks he does his own job well gets pissed at someone — Graeber — he thinks does a job poorly), but I wonder why DeLong is spending so much time on it.
th existence market
Date: 2013-10-22 04:12 pm (UTC)--mza.