The Euro Zone Is A Slow-Motion Train Wreck

[koganbot]

"'The euro zone is a slow-motion train wreck,' Mr. Roubini said during a separate panel discussion."

Slow-wreck aficionados will note that this is better than a couple of months ago, when Europe was on the train-wreck fast track owing to the ECB's then-unwillingness to purchase Spanish and Italian bonds.*

Confused centipede attempts to mate with mealworm pupa


*It's not directly purchasing them now, but, according to Krugman at any rate, it's doing the functional equivalent, essentially laundering the purchases through banks.

Comments

[koganbot]

Different argument from what? That is, would either Krugman or Roubini disagree with this from Davies:

IMO the valid criticisms of the EU policy structure would be something like

f) their continued insistence on 'structural' measures which have basically nothing to do with the problems they are meant to solve and which can only be explained as holdover neoliberalism

g) their apparent state of denial over the need for a proper rewrite of the ECB treaty and the fundamental legal basis of EMU (although I am actually never sure how much denial they are actually in here)

h) the constant iteration of completely unrealistic forecasts. In general, wasting time for the first two years of the crisis on confidence-fairy reasoning.

i) As Niamh correctly notes, regular bouts of complete political tone-deafness in the handling of the difficult and sensitive matter of transferring fiscal independence.

Of course, I don't know what Roubini would say, barely having read him, and I don't know all that much what Krugman would say either, not really having understood him. But my guess is that if Davies' argument is that actually the EU functionaries and policy makers generally do have a decent idea, at this point, of what needs to be done and are doing their best, given the political and treaty constraints, to do it, that doesn't mean that they can do it — given the political and treaty constraints. And the political constraints are that in general most Europeans don't know what should be done. That's what a whole big hunk of the "political constraints" are. And also, given the fact of the currency union and that the European labor force doesn't have nearly the mobility of the American, would rewriting the treaties be enough to solve the problem that (a) none of the periphery countries in the monetary union can devalue their currency, since they don't have their own currencies, (b) the periphery countries need somehow for there to be increased demand for their goods and services, and (c) the labor force in those countries can't pick up and leave for other parts nearly as easily as the labor force in Miami (whose economy is about the size of Greece's) or Las Vegas can?

So Roubini, let's say, can see what Davies sees and nonetheless believe that Elvis has left the building, the train is already running off the track, etc. I'm gathering from that thread that Davies isn't as pessimistic, but I'm not sure where the nonpessimism is coming from.

Also, Greece is in a different boat — er, boxcar — from the other countries, apparently. But, e.g., is getting Greece's shit together in regards to tax collection and creating realistic budgets going to help the Greeks find markets for their goods and services? (Not a rhetorical question, even though I assume the answer is "No.")

I didn't have time to read the whole thread, merely did a Ctrl-f on "dsquared," so am not getting the nuance of the discussion, having to infer mostly from Davies' posts what he's reacting to. Wouldn't get the nuance of the discussion anyway, given my poor understanding of finance.