Frank Kogan

Hey Leonard, nice to have you on my lj!

The question I'd put to you is this: what do you mean by "universal"? For instance, I'd say that natural selection is a social construct, it's use is historically contingent, etc., but nonetheless it's an idea that I think is applicable wherever there is life. And I take the idea as axiomatic, meaning not just that I think it's true but that it's a principle used to organize facts. So I'd have trouble even imagining how a fact could run counter to natural selection, given that I'm using natural selection to interpret the facts rather than using the facts to test the axiom. So, do I believe in universals? Well, I understand that axioms get overthrown* (but that doesn't necessarily mean that this one will get overthrown), and though I think that natural selection is true, I don't believe it must be true in all possible universes (though I still can't imagine how it could be untrue), or even, therefore, in this one.

So, would an antirelativist call me a "relativist"? Probably, in that I don't think there's something beyond the practice of evolutionary biology that "grounds" or "proves" natural selection, that takes me beyond the axiom to a set of facts that could disprove natural selection. But to me that's a rather esoteric philosophical point I've made, that you can't get beyond the axiom to a set of facts that are "independent" of the axiom and that therefore can be used to test the axiom. For practical purposes, natural selection might as well be a universal, in the way that I use it.

My question, therefore, is why do people think that the esoteric philosophical point is a big deal? (My answer would be "Well, they don't understand the point," but that just begs the question.)

*The way an axiom gets overthrown isn't by being compared to a set of facts but by a different axiom appearing that seems to do a whole lot more than the first axiom.