Frank Kogan

P30:
i: "What characterises revolutions is, thus, change in several of the taxonomic categories prerequisite to scientific descriptions and generalisations... (intervening sentences also pertinent)... [T]his sort of alteration is necessarily holistic. That holism... is rooted in the nature of language, for the criteria relevant to categorisation are ipso fatso the criteria that attach the names of those categories to the world."
ii: "Language is a coinage with two faces, one looking outward to the world, the other inward to the world's reflection in the referential structure of the language."

I wish Mark hadn't combined all of i into one, since Kuhn is actually changing subject midparagraph when he starts talking about "the nature of language" - is venturing stupifyingly vague and incoherent opinions on a matter he could safely ignore. So I think you can safely ignore anything Kuhn says on that subject - or maybe I should say it's dangerous not to ignore it. But we probably shouldn't ignore such things if we want to understand Kuhn, since he surely believed he had good reasons for bringing them up.

But crucially, I think you can simply have no opinion on "the nature of language" and nonetheless discuss anything interesting you ever want to discuss about paradigms and paradigm shifts and incommensurability and scientific revolutions. That is, you - or I, at any rate - can dismiss the phrase "referential structure of language" as an impossibly opaque buzzword while nonetheless getting the point from what Kuhn says earlier that Aristotle's concept of motion gives you a taxonomy (that, you know, organizes objects and events and stuff) that differs from the taxonomy given by Newton's concept.

(As for "the whetchamacallit structure of whatever": should there be actual confusion as to what a particular conversation ought to be about, there can be specific instances when we might want to ask "what is being structured here?" E.g., a business organization structures power relations in a firm, beams can provide the structure of a building, a class schedule structures your school day, one-way streets can direct traffic flow, the common structure of scientific revolutions is that they seem to all follow particular stages, etc. And you can ask such a question without ever having a general opinion as to what it is that is "structured" by language as a whole.)

As for why I think Kuhn is wandering into an unnecessary tangle here, that's a subject I'd like to bracket and bring up at some other time. But I'll point out now that he's actually contradicting what he says elsewhere - e.g., back in The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions he says that people with different paradigms live in different worlds, which is itself a problematic statement but it's very much not the same as saying that the world is reflected by the referential structure of language.