"Intuitions" = sensations or sense impressions (a loaded term, one of the points of chapter three being to show just how loaded) as they exist in the inner space of our mind, as representatives of what's out (which can never be experieced directly, "experience" also being a loaded term, since for Locke and Kant(?) it doesn't include what you say and do, just what your five senses sense), but our "sensations" as we actually live them aren't the intuitions themselves but the intuitions as organized by our concepts, or something (and this muddies up my definition of "experience" in the previous parenthesis, so I don't know)
"Concepts" = you know, like, concepts, like, "gold" is a concept and includes the thought that gold is a yellow metal, and "bodies" include the thought that bodies have extension (according to Kant), and space and time are concepts; intuitions are "given" to us, whereas our concepts organize and create the conditions for how we experience our intuitions; so how we experience what's "out there" is really through how we organize (conceptualize?) our intuitions "in here," including how we constitute space and time and our ideas of extension etc. (so in effect Kant moves "out there" into "in here" and calls it "phenomena," while asserting that "noumena" nonetheless are truly out there (why?) with intuitions functioning as their emissaries)
Intuitions are given to us and our concepts organize and structure The Given. Concepts are a priori while intuitions are a posteriori, I guess, though I don't quite get this, since we can learn concepts (and what about concepts that turn out to be wrong, like phlogiston, or imaginary, like centaurs?). What I've written in this comment isn't even from my lost memories of reading Kant but from memories of secondary sources I've run into since then, including Philosophy And The Mirror Of Nature.
It's the distinction between what's Given versus How It's Organized By Our Mind that Rorty is saying that Kant and Kantian historiographers incorrectly project back onto earlier philosophy - I think there's some analogy (or stronger) between universals and concepts, though I'm not so sure about particulars and intuitions, and again Kant believes that intuitions only are experienced by us pre-organized by concepts, and in chapter four Rorty is saying that Sellars demolishes this distinction at the same time that Quine is demolishing the analytic-synthetic distinction, but neither is quite comprehending the demolition effected by the other.
no subject
"Concepts" = you know, like, concepts, like, "gold" is a concept and includes the thought that gold is a yellow metal, and "bodies" include the thought that bodies have extension (according to Kant), and space and time are concepts; intuitions are "given" to us, whereas our concepts organize and create the conditions for how we experience our intuitions; so how we experience what's "out there" is really through how we organize (conceptualize?) our intuitions "in here," including how we constitute space and time and our ideas of extension etc. (so in effect Kant moves "out there" into "in here" and calls it "phenomena," while asserting that "noumena" nonetheless are truly out there (why?) with intuitions functioning as their emissaries)
Intuitions are given to us and our concepts organize and structure The Given. Concepts are a priori while intuitions are a posteriori, I guess, though I don't quite get this, since we can learn concepts (and what about concepts that turn out to be wrong, like phlogiston, or imaginary, like centaurs?). What I've written in this comment isn't even from my lost memories of reading Kant but from memories of secondary sources I've run into since then, including Philosophy And The Mirror Of Nature.
It's the distinction between what's Given versus How It's Organized By Our Mind that Rorty is saying that Kant and Kantian historiographers incorrectly project back onto earlier philosophy - I think there's some analogy (or stronger) between universals and concepts, though I'm not so sure about particulars and intuitions, and again Kant believes that intuitions only are experienced by us pre-organized by concepts, and in chapter four Rorty is saying that Sellars demolishes this distinction at the same time that Quine is demolishing the analytic-synthetic distinction, but neither is quite comprehending the demolition effected by the other.